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NOT FOR THE FAINT OF HEART: DOES A
HOSPITAL OWE A DUTY TO WARN A
SQUEAMISH VISITOR?
MARC D. GINSBERG* & TRICIA E. MCVICKER**

I.

INTRODUCTION

A hospital, and particularly its emergency department, is
popularly perceived as a hectic and chaotic place.1 Physicians,
nurses, and other health care professionals scramble to treat the
critically and not so critically ill. Emergency medicine physicians
are specially trained in this field and are required - as are all
physicians - to treat emergency patients in compliance with the
applicable standard of care.2
What are apt descriptions of the hospital and emergency
department environments? A classic emergency medicine text
proclaims that:
In the ED [emergency department], entropy states favor chaos. Left
to their own rhythms, events outrun the ED staff. Thus, success
depends on the ability to control (1) intake of patients (2) the ED
environment, (3) patient-care events, and (4) disposition resources. 3
"The ED is governed by exigency. Actions of ED personnel
are for the most part reactions. Events unfold quickly, demanding
attention. These events can sometimes be steered but certainly
not halted."4

* B.A., with Honors, University of Illinois (Chicago); M.A., Indiana
University, J.D., with Highest Distinction, The John Marshall Law School
(Chicago); LL.M (Health Law), DePaul University; Member (Litigation),
Dykema Gossett (Chicago, Illinois); Adjunct Professor of Law, The John
Marshall Law School (Chicago).
** B.S.N., Lakeview College of Nursing; J.D., The John Marshall Law
School (Chicago); Associate (Litigation), Dykema Gossett (Chicago, Illinois).
1. See Robert H. Dailey, Approach to the Patient in the Emergency
Department, in 1 Emergency Medicine: Concepts and Clinical Practice 137
(Peter Rosen, et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998) (1983) (stating that an emergency
department's chaos has contributed to emergency medical practice).
2. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 242, at 631-32 (West Group

2000) (explaining that physicians agree to provide their services in accordance
with their professional standard of care).
3. Dailey, supra note 1, at 137.
4. Id.
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A justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania noted that:
Hospitals are not pleasant institutions by definition. The struggle
between life and death occurs daily within its walls. People with
horrible diseases and unpleasant appearances are likely to be
encountered. 5
Family members and friends may accompany patients to the
emergency room, observe, and in some fashion, assist in the care
provided there. They provide comfort and support to the patient.
Unquestionably, the family member or friend, not medically
trained, may observe injuries or treatments that are unpleasant to
view. This observation can cause fainting due to a blood injury
phobia or vasovagal reaction.'
Additionally, emergency room
visitors who faint may suffer injuries, including head injuries.'
This paper assesses the relationship between the hospital visitor
and the hospital, and explores whether, on any theory, the
hospital owes a tort duty to warn a visitor who may suffer an
unfortunate injury precipitated by observing treatment or
conditions in the hospital.
II. BASIC TORT PRINCIPLES
It is intuitively obvious that the hospital visitor who
accompanies the patient is not the patient. The visitor is not owed
the professional duty of care that a physician owes a patient"
because the visitor is not in the hospital for treatment.
What, then, is the status of the visitor vis-bL-vis the hospital?
A short course on the duties owed by owners and occupiers of land
may be helpful.
Historically, persons appearing on the property of others are
characterized as trespassers, licensees, or invitees.' Trespassers

5. Marcus v. Frankford Hosp., 283 A.2d 69, 75 (Pa. 1971) (Roberts, J.,
Opinion in Support of Judgment N.O.V.).
6. See Alexis M. Fenton et al., Vasovagal Syncope, in 133 ANNALS OF
INTERNAL MEDICINE 714, 715-18 (Nov. 7, 2000) (describing the physical
processes that lead to fainting); Alexander L. Gerlach et al., Blood-Injury
Phobia With and Without a History of Fainting: Disgust Sensitivity Does Not
Explain the Fainting Response, 68 PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 331-39 (2006)

(concluding that the tendency to faint when exposed to blood-injury stimuli
may suffice as a conditioning event leading into phobia, without specific

involvement of disgust sensitivity and parasympathetic activation); Ross v.
Vanderbilt Univ. Med. Ctr., 27 S.W.3d 523, 525 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000)
(explaining the vasovagal reactions as a stress phenomenon).
7. See, e.g., Murillo v. Griffin Hosp., 823 A.2d 1202, 1204 (Conn. 2003)
(describing the severe injuries sustained when a woman fainted at a hospital).
8. See DOBBS, supra note 2, at 631 (stating that the physician stands in a
special relationship to the patient); BARRY K. FURROW ET AL., HEATH LAw, § 62, at 238-45 (West Publishing Co. 1995) (explaining that the professional
standard governs the physician when a patient is under his care).
9. W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 393 (W.
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are "intruders" and enter or remain "upon land in the possession of
another without a privilege to do so." ° The general rule is that
"the possessor is not liable for injury to trespassers caused by his
failure to exercise reasonable care to put his land in a safe
condition for them, or to carry on his activities in a manner which
does not endanger them."" No further explanation is required
here. It is not likely that a hospital visitor would ever be
characterized as a trespasser because visitors appear in hospitals
on a consensual basis."
Licensees have been characterized as those who enter the
premises of another for their own purposes with the consent of the
possessor."3 Social visitors have been defined as licensees." In
general, the possessor of land is obligated only to warn a licensee
of hidden dangers known to the possessor. 5
The invitee is the classic business customer. The invitee
enters the premises at the invitation of the possessor and is owed
a duty of protection against dangers of which the possessor knows
and against those which, with reasonable care, might be
discovered. 6
How should the hospital visitor, accompanying a patient to an
emergency room or other treatment area without objection by the
hospital, be characterized? Is the visitor an invitee or a licensee?
Does the visitor's presence further an economic benefit of the
hospital? Does the visitor seem more of a "public invitee?" 7 Is the
visitor more like the classic licensee, to whom a very restricted
duty is owed? If a duty is owed, is it a duty to warn hospital
visitors that they may observe unpleasant sights and faint?
Judicial opinions considering this issue will be explored in order to
determine the legal "dignity" and plight of the hospital visitor who
is injured as a result of fainting.

Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed., West Publishing Co. 1984) (1941).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 393-94.
12. See Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., Licensees in Landoccupiers'Liability Law
- Should They Be Exterminated or Resurrected?, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 67, 74
(2002) (noting that a hospital's business purposes include allowing visitors to
visit patients) (citing Sutherland v. St. FrancisHosp. Inc., 595 P.2d 780 (Okla.
1979)).
13. KEETON, supranote 9, at 412.
14. Id. at 413.
15. Id. at 414-15.
16. Id. at 419.
17. Id. at 422-23.

The John MarshallLaw Review

[41:473

III. CASELAW
A. Minnesota
In McElwain v. Van Beck,18 the Court of Appeals of Minnesota
considered a claim of an emergency department patient's sister
who fainted during her brother's treatment. The facts are quite
simple and ordinary. The plaintiff was standing next to her
brother and holding his hand in the ER while he was treated for a
nasal injury. The physician administered a local anesthetic, the
plaintiff fainted, fell, fractured her skull and suffered hearing loss.
Interestingly, there was no evidence connecting the plaintiffs
fainting episode "to anything in the emergency room." 19 The
plaintiff was neither squeamish at the sight of blood nor had
previously fainted upon the sight of blood. The trial court entered
summary judgment against plaintiff and the court of appeals
affirmed.
The plaintiffs claim in McElwain was based on two theories.
The first suggested the medical negligence of the physician
treating her brother. The court easily dispensed of this argument,
noting that in the absence of a physician-patient relationship a
tort duty did not exist. The court further noted that the plaintiffs
claim did not constitute a Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of
California ° type situation, in which a physician may owe a duty to
warn a non-patient third party of the dangerous propensities of a
patient who makes specific threats to the third party.
Furthermore, the claim in McElwain2 did not implicate a
physician's duty to control a patient presenting a danger to a third
party, which is also recognized by Minnesota law.
B. Connecticut
22
In Murillo v. Griffin Hospital,
the court considered the claim
of a plaintiff who fainted and fell after observing a medical
procedure performed on her sister. Essentially, the plaintiff
observed multiple efforts to perform venipunctures on her sister to
gain IV access. The plaintiff advised a hospital nurse that she was
going to faint. She repeated the statement but the nurse made no
effort to assist her. The plaintiff fainted, fell to the floor, suffered
a broken jaw, broken and chipped teeth, facial lacerations and

18. 447 N.W.2d 442 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
19. Id. at 444.
20. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976); Brian Ginsberg, Tarasoff at Thirty: Victim's

Knowledge Shrinks the Psychotherapist'sDuty to Warn and Protect, 21 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1 (2004); Brian Ginsberg, Therapists Behaving

Badly: Why the Tarasoff Duty is Not Always Economically Efficient, 43
WILLAMETTE L. REv. 31 (2007).
21. McElwain, 447 N.W.2d at 444.
22. 823 A.2d at 1202.
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post-fall headaches. She required surgical and medical treatment
and suffered lost wages. The court held that "as a matter of public
policy, the defendants owed no duty to the plaintiff - a [nonpatient] bystander ...to prevent foreseeable injury to her as a
result of her observing the medical procedures performed on her
sister."23
In Connecticut, four factors comprise the formula that
determines the existence of a legal duty as a matter of public
policy: "(1) the normal expectations of the participants in the
activity under review; (2) the public policy of encouraging
participation in the activity, while weighing the safety of the
participants; (3) the avoidance of increased litigators, and (4) the
decisions of other jurisdictions." 4 The court identified the plaintiff
here as a "bystander," not the focus of the medical attention. The
normal expectation of the participants was to care for and about
the plaintiffs sister, not to concentrate on the plaintiff, who chose
to observe the needle insertion procedure.
As to the second factor, the court noted that the law should
encourage physicians to concentrate on patients and not
bystanders. As to the third factor, the recognition of a duty to a
hospital bystander would simply encourage lawsuits due to
injuries sustained by those witnessing medical procedures.
With respect to the fourth factor, the law of other
jurisdictions, the court referred to cases arising in Pennsylvania,25
Illinois, 26 and Kansas27 in support of its position in Murillo. It
should be noted, however, that in O'Hara v. Holy Cross Hospital,28
the Supreme Court of Illinois held that a duty to protect the nonpatient visitor arises once she is invited to participate in care and
treatment.25
C. Pennsylvania
In Sacks v. Thomas Jefferson University Hospital, ° the trial
court considered the classic scenario of the visitor to the hospital
emergency room. The plaintiff brought her daughter to the ER for
treatment of a forehead wound. The ER physician asked her to
hold her daughter's head while he was suturing the wound. While
the plaintiff observed the procedure, she told a hospital "agent"

23. Id. at 1204.

24. Id. at 1205.
25. Sacks v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 684 F. Supp. 858 (E.D. Pa.
1988).
26. O'Hara v. Holy Cross Hosp., 561 N.E.2d 18 (Il1. 1990).
27. Walters v. St. Francis Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 932 P.2d 1041 (Kan. Ct. App.
1997).
28. O'Hara,561 N.E.2d at 18.
29. Id. at 22.
30. 684 F.Supp. at 858.
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"that she felt faint and was going to leave the treatment room. 0 "1
While leaving the room, she fainted, fell and was injured.
The issue for the trial court was classic. The plaintiff
contended that since the physician requested her assistance, the
hospital created a risk of harm to her and created a duty of care to
protect her. The hospital's position was that it owed no duty to "a
non-patient observing treatment of a patient in an emergency
room setting."32
The court analyzed this scenario in a traditional negligence
context. It emphasized that the hospital never accepted the
plaintiff as a patient and she was never in a physician-patient
relationship with the hospital.
By voluntarily entering the
treatment room, the plaintiff "accepted the risk that she would
witness events or conditions inherent in the medical treatment
which could upset her. She was not required to be present nor was
she required to hold her daughter's head. Indeed, 33she abandoned
her daughter to leave the room when she felt faint."
Not surprisingly, the plaintiff argued her fainting episode was
foreseeable. The court countered that "forseeability of injury,
however, in the absence of a duty to prevent that injury is an
insufficient basis on which to rest liability."34 The court held that
the plaintiff failed to prove the existence of duty owed to her by the
hospital.
Finally, the trial court emphasized the plaintiffs role with
respect to her daughter's emergency as well as the plight of her
claim:
Parents have a duty to obtain medical attention for their children
when the need arises. However, this only creates a duty of care on
the part of the hospital not to injure the child and in no way imposes
a special duty of care on the part of the hospital to protect the child's
parents from encountering the unpleasantness of their children's
injuries or the unpleasantness necessarily inherent in a medical
35
emergency response to those injuries.
The court granted the hospital's motion to dismiss.
In Sacks, the court cited the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
in Marcus v. FrankfordHospital6 to distinguish the facts. Marcus
is an interesting case and yields, perhaps, a surprising result. In
Marcus,37 a fourteen year old volunteer "candy striper" worked at
Frankford Hospital. She attended an orientation, but, as with
others in this program, was not permitted to work in the pediatric,
31. Id. at 859.
32. Id.
33. Id.

34. Id. at 860.
35. Id.
36. 283 A.2d at 69.
37. Marcus, 283 A.2d at 71.
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obstetric, emergency department or operating room.
The
plaintiff's typical assignment included "reading mail to patients,
filling water pitchers, giving out flowers, changing unoccupied
beds and accompanying patients to the discharge desk."38 On the
day in question, the plaintiff was requested by a hospital nurse to
assist her and another nurse with a male patient. The plaintiff
held the patient while the nurses washed him and attended to his
bedsores. The patient was unconscious and naked and covered
with excrement. The plaintiff became nauseated and told a nurse
she did not feel well. She fainted, fell and struck her face on an
oxygen tank. She suffered serious facial injuries as a consequence.
The plaintiff filed a suit against the hospital and won a
verdict of eleven thousand dollars for her "pain, suffering and
embarrassment." 39
The
hospital moved
for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict.
On appeal, the court considered the hospital's position that it
owed no duty of care to the plaintiff. The court disagreed, stating:
Given the nature and purposes of the services to be performed by
[plaintiff], the circumscribed extent of the training she received, the
limited experience she had had during her two to three day period of
work at the hospital, combined with her extreme youth, all as
described... it cannot be said as a matter of law that appellant
owed no duty to its nurses' aid not to subject her, without warning
or preparation of any kind, into a situation as unpleasant and
emotionally disturbing as that to which this child was subjected.
That in such circumstances the minor might become so upset as to
faint, with injurious consequences to herself, was not beyond the
bounds of foreseeability to a reasonably prudent master. °
At trial, the hospital failed to convince the court to instruct
the jury on the plaintiffs assumption for risk. On appeal, the
court held that neither plaintiffs training nor experience would
have predicted her assistance in the activities leading to her
fainting spell and injuries. Therefore, plaintiff would not have
voluntarily encountered a known risk and accepted it.
Judge Roberts authored a separate opinion in support of the
hospital's request for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
("JNOV"). This opinion emphasized that the hospital discharged
its duty to the plaintiff by its training, orientation, and assignment
limitations. This opinion forcefully concluded as follows:
Hospitals are not pleasant institutions by definition. The struggle
between life and death occurs daily within its walls. People with
horrible diseases and unpleasant appearances are likely to be
encountered. I cannot agree that the hospital, with its carefully

38. Id. at 72.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 73.
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regulated volunteer program, was negligent
in any way toward
41
appellee. I would grant judgment N.O.V.
D. Kansas
The Court of Appeals of Kansas, in Walters v. St. Francis
Hospital and Medical Center,4 reviewed the order granting
summary judgment for the hospital in connection with the
plaintiffs claim. The plaintiff fainted and was injured while his
fiancee was receiving treatment following ER care and admission
to her room.
The plaintiff observed his fianc6e receive a nasogastric tube.
His fianc6e requested that the plaintiff stay to hold her hand
during a third attempt at tube placement, which was successful.
Thereafter, the plaintiff stated he did not feel well, sat down in his
fianc6e's room and rested for a short time. He then left the room
and went to the nurses' station, where he was asked if he was all
right and replied that he was. However, as the plaintiff stood at
the nurses' station, he lost consciousness and fell to the floor. He
suffered a head injury, which required brain surgery.
The hospital took the position that it breached no duty to the
plaintiff and that there was an absence of proximate causation.
The trial court applied the law of premises liability and granted
summary judgment.
The court of appeals noted that the plaintiff was not a patient
when he fell, and therefore the hospital did not owe him a
professional duty of care. The court of appeals characterized the
plaintiff as a hospital visitor and an "invitee." Therefore, the
hospital owed him a duty to exercise reasonable care.
The issue was whether the hospital duty of care included the
duty to warn the plaintiff "that he might become distressed or ill
from watching and assisting while the tube was being inserted, to
ask him if he had a sensitivity to the sight of blood, to warn him
that he should leave the room, and to assist him after he stated he
was not feeling well."" The trial court held that St. Francis had no
duty to warn of an open and obvious danger - the danger of
fainting from feeling queasy." The court of appeals noted that "a
possessor of land is under no duty to remove known and obvious
dangers."45
The court of appeals embraced the Sacks" analysis previously
discussed in this paper, but held, without explanation, that the

41. Id. at 75.

42.
43.
44.
45.

932 P.2d at 1041.
Id. at 1044.
Id.
Id.

46. Sacks, 684 F. Supp. at 859.

2008]

Does a Hospital Owe a Duty to Warn a Squeamish Visitor?

481

hospital owed the plaintiff "the duty to inform him of the
procedure that was going to be performed." 47 If this is a true duty,
what is its basis? Why does a hospital owe a non-patient any
medical information? If this is so, isn't it only a short leap of logic
to expect that the hospital should then warn the non-patient of the
adverse reaction which may occur when observing the procedure?
The court of appeals opted out of this quandary, relying on
something in the nature of assumption of risk.' The court stated:
The danger of becoming queasy or fainting, however, was open,
obvious, and known to Walters. We conclude that ordinary and
reasonable care does not require a hospital to warn an invitee that
he or she might have an adverse reaction to witnessing a medical
procedure. More specifically, a hospital has no duty to warn an
invitee about the possibility of becoming queasy or fainting from
witnessing a medical procedure because this is a danger that is
open, obvious and known to the invitee. The myriad of possible
adverse reactions of an individual accompanying another to the
hospital are not within the knowledge of the hospital. A contrary
conclusion could open hospitals to claims that would cause hospital
to bar all visitors during all treatments.49
Therefore, the court of appeals concluded that the hospital did not
breach a duty owed to plaintiff. There was no issue of proximate
cause.
E. Oklahoma
In Jackson v. Mercy Health Center," the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma considered a claim that is factually pertinent to the
focus of this paper, but disposed of the claim by examining the
State's Good Samaritan Act. Here, a husband accompanied his
pregnant wife to the hospital and to an operating room to observe
her Caesarean section delivery. He became dizzy while observing
the preoperative anesthesia preparations. Attending hospital
personnel assisted him in sitting on his wife's hospital bed, which
was in the hall outside of the OR. He then fell from the bed and
was injured. He claimed that the hospital owed him a duty to
prevent his fall.
The supreme court clearly characterized the plaintiff as a
"visitor" and the hospital as the "invitor."5" However, the plaintiff
urged the court to transform his status from a visitor to a patient,
as he had attended a childbirth class and agreed to pay his wife's
hospital expenses as well as those of his child. Not surprisingly,
In a footnote, the court
this argument was to no avail.
47. Walters, 932 P.2d at 1045.

48. DOBBS, supra note 2, at 534-39.
49. Walters, 932 P.2d at 1045.
50. 864 P.2d 839 (Okla. 1993).

51. Id. at 844.
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acknowledged that the Oklahoma law of premises liability would
be implicated in a "visitor-invitee" scenario.52 One commentator
has noted that "courts have held that a hospital's business
purposes include allowing visitors to visit patients."53 Therefore,
the visitor would be classified as an invitee.
F. Florida
In Ziegler & Ziegler v. Tenet Health Systems,54 a husband
became an ER visitor and observer of his wife's emergency
treatment. He arrived at the ER to see his wife receive treatment
for an injured finger. His assistance with and observation of her
treatment was explained as follows:
When Ziegler saw that the nurse was having trouble treating his
wife, he got up onto the gurney, put one arm around his wife's waist
to hold her steady, and held out her injured hand so that the nurse
could treat the finger. As he did so, he viewed her injury, which
appeared to him as though she had severed the top part of her
finger.
Once the nurse finished applying the dressing, a physician's
assistant came in and began applying a second dressing. As that
occurred, Ziegler said that he felt hot. The physician's assistant told
Ziegler he should go back to the waiting room. After getting off the
gurney, Ziegler started to walk away and
fainted, falling face-first to
55
the floor and severely injuring himself.
The husband urged that a tort duty was owed him based on the
foreseeability of his injury. Predictably, the defendant urged that
no duty was owed and that the risk of fainting was "open and
obvious."56
The Ziegler court reviewed the opinions in Sacks, 7 Walters,58
Zenkina v. Sisters of Providence in Washington,59 and O'Hara," all
previously discussed here. Simply, the court declined to apply
61
O'Hara
and held that the "hospital owed no duty to protect a nonpatient bystander from fainting.""2

52. Id. at 842 n.4.

53.
54.
55.
56.

Reynolds, supra note 12, at 74.
956 So. 2d 551 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
Id. at 553.
Id.

57. Sacks, 684 F. Supp. at 859.
58. Walters, 932 P.2d at 1045.

59.
60.
61.
62.

922 P.2d 171 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996).
O'Hara,561 N.E.2d at 18.
Id.
Ziegler, 956 So. 2d at 551.
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G. Illinois
In O'Hara v. Holy Cross Hospital,' the Supreme Court of
Illinois confronted the issue of whether the defendant hospital
"owed plaintiff, a nonpatient bystander in the emergency room of a
hospital, a duty to protect her from the injuries sustained
herein."'
In O'Hara, the plaintiff took her son to the ER for
treatment of a facial injury. A nurse invited her to accompany her
son. She wiped anesthetic from her son's mouth, fainted, hit her
head, and suffered a brain injury."'
In pre-trial discovery, the plaintiff testified that the ER
physician "asked her to take a piece of gauze and wipe the
Novocain from her son's mouth while the nurse lifted the covering
from her son's face."66
The ER physician's deposition testimony, predictably, was
different. He testified that the plaintiff desired to be with her son
and that she informed him she had previously observed the
placement of sutures and "assured him that she would not become
ill." 7 He instructed her not to wipe her son's mouth due to the risk
of infection and then gave her a sterile gauze to do so. The
anesthetic took effect, so he began to suture the wound and the
plaintiff moved away and fainted. '
After disposing of arguments in support of and against the
existence of a "special relationship" between plaintiff and her son,69
the court addressed whether the hospital owed plaintiff a duty to
protect her from fainting. The court identified two rules: (1) a
hospital ER owes no duty to protect a non-patient bystander from
fainting simply by allowing the bystander to remain with the
patient during treatment; (2) the duty to protect from fainting does
exist if the bystander is invited to participate in care and
treatment of the patient.0
The court, without citation to authority except the deposition
testimony of the ER physician, noted a minimal likelihood that a
bystander would faint. The court emphasized the enormity of the
burden of guarding against such episodes, short of excluding
visitors from emergency rooms, an undesirable result.
The court, in recognizing the duty owed to a bystander
"actively" involved in emergency care, stated the burden to guard
against fainting and the consequences of the burden are not

63. O'Hara,561 N.E.2d at 18.
64. Id. at 19.

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 20.

70. See generally id. (describing a hospital's duty of care to a nonpatient
bystander if the bystanders asked to participate in the treatment).
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onerous because "an emergency room should not have to enlist the
aid of a nonpatient bystander."7 1 The court held that whether
plaintiff was invited to participate in the care of her son was a
question of fact for the trial court.
What is the duty owed to protect an actively involved
bystander from fainting? Must the hospital provide personnel to
hold the bystander? Must the hospital provide a soft landing?
Frankly, how would a court determine the involvement of a
visitor as "active"? Can a visitor be inactively involved in patient
care? How can any non-medical professional bystander actively
participate in the treatment of a patient? The O'Hara court does
not answer these questions.
H. Washington State
In Zenkina, the aunt of a ten-year-old boy observed his chin
wound in the hospital emergency room and fainted after the ER
physician opened the wound to clean it. 7
She suffered head
injuries and was hospitalized.
The plaintiff, the boy's aunt, was assisting in interpreting for
the patient. She had testified that the ER physician asked her to
hold the child's hands in the event he attempted to move suddenly.
She placed her hand on top of the child's head to comfort him and
thereafter fainted. Plaintiff claimed that the hospital owed her a
duty to warn of the risks attendant to observing the treatment,
including the risk of fainting. The hospital moved for summary
judgment, urging the lack of a duty owed to a non-patient, that she
was not directed to assist the treatment and that she assumed the
risk of fainting. The motion was granted.73
Pursuant to a premises liability analysis, the court held that
the plaintiff was an invitee to whom a duty of ordinary care was
owed.74
That duty essentially encompassed maintaining the
hospital premises in good condition.5 The court held that it would
be an unreasonable burden to prevent non-patients in the hospital
from fainting without banning them from the premises. 76
The plaintiff urged the court to adopt the O'Hara
participation in treatment basis for a duty. 77 The court simply
concluded that plaintiff was not requested to participate in
medical treatment. The plaintiff was requested to translate, to

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 22.
922 P.2d at 172.
Id. at 173.
Id. at 174.
Id.
Id.
O'Hara,561 N.E.2d at 23.
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comfort and to restrain a child, and the court characterized these
as "acts of human kindness.""8
The Zenkina court found that to prevent bystanders from
fainting would require barring them from the premises."
Requiring hospitals to warn of the risk of fainting "would be to
require hospitals to warn of a risk that is so well known as to
require no warning at all."" The court declined the invitation to
impose the duty to warn.
IV. CONCLUSION

"The professional duty of a hospital is to provide a safe
environment for patient diagnosis, treatment and recovery. "8'
Certainly, a hospital owes a duty as an owner or occupier of land
to keep its premises safe. Somewhere between the patient and the
typical business invitee is the hospital visitor who accompanies a
patient to the ER or other treatment area and observes injuries or
treatment.
What duty is reasonably owed to the squeamish hospital
visitor who observes these unpleasant sights, faints, and is
injured? Hospitals are not likely interested in banning visitors
from accompanying patients to ERs and other treatment rooms.
Although this practice will protect against a bystander who faints
at the sight of blood, it is inhumane and not good for business.
Assuming the presence of visitors, merely warning them that
fainting may occur at the sight of blood or injury will not protect
against fainting. How would the hospital give the warning? A
writing would add yet another document to a hospital chart.
Illinois, in O'Hara,2 gives lip service to the higher duty to
protect the bystander from fainting if the bystander is invited to
participate in patient care. This duty appears to mandate more
than merely warning that fainting may occur. How can the
hospital discharge this duty? If the vasovagal reaction8 occurs,
fainting will occur. If the bystander faints and falls to the floor or
contacts an object before hitting the floor, injury may occur. The
only method that could protect from injury as a result of fainting is
the assignment of a person (or device of some sort) to the
bystander to intervene once fainting occurs but before injury
occurs. Therefore, there is no effective protection against fainting
other than (1) barring visitors from accompanying patients in

78. Zenkina, 922 P.2d at 176.

79. Id.

80. Id.
81. FURROW ET AL., supra note 8, at 461.
82. O'Hara,561 N.E.2d at 21-23.
83. See Fenton et al. supra note 6 (explaining the vasovagal syncope and
fainting).
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treatment areas or (2) barring other hospital visitors from
observing any unpleasantry that could trigger fainting.
Simply put, duties to warn of and protect against fainting or
injury due to fainting are unworkable. Hospital visitors should
understand that hospitals are filled with ill persons, who bleed or
have unpleasant injuries - the observation of which may cause
fainting.

